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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD. OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION N OTICE 










Eric Anderson 92A 7918 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 8 
Otisville, New York 10963 
08-077-19 B 
July 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 23 months. 
Demosthenes, Alexander, Davis 
Appellant's Letter-brief received November 7, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ Vacated, remanded fo r de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
V-:::rmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to----
_ V_acated, remanded for de nQvo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board' s determination must be annexed.hereto. 
This Final Detenn_ination, the rel~ted St_atement of the Appeals Unit's Finding~ and the sepa5ate fin~dings o.f 
the Parole Board, 1f any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, 1f any, on 311t/62f;bJt) t.·6 . r • . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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   Appellant challenges the July 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 
23-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for several different crimes. In the first, he shot two 
people to death with a handgun. In the second, he shot another victim to death with a shotgun. And 
in the third, while incarcerated in State prison, he caused seriously physical injury to two other 
inmates by stabbing them with an ice pick. Appellant raises the following  issues: 1) the decision 
is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required 
statutory factors. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision lacks substantial evidence. 4) the 
Board failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 5) the decision lacks future 
guidance. 6) the decision illegally resentenced him. 7) community opposition is not allowed. 8) 
the decision lacks detail. 9) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution in that 
he was not given a right to counsel, not allowed to view all records in the parole file, etc. 10) the 
Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was 
ignored, the departure was void, and that statistically he should have been released. Also, the 2011 
amendments and regulations create a constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of 
early release. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
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   That the Board found appellant’s postconviction activities outweighed by the serious nature of 
his crimes does not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider them, see Matter 
of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994), or 
render the decision irrational, see Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). 
   Although the Board place emphasis upon the heinous nature of the murder, the Board was not 
required to give equal weight to or specifically discuss each factor considered.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Marcus v. 
Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 476, 476, 862 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Moore v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 274 A.D.2d 886, 712 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 2000), appeal dismissed, 
95 N.Y.2d 958, 722 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1026, 121 S. Ct. 1974 (2001). 
   The Board’s emphasis on the violent nature of the crime does not establish irrationality bordering 
on impropriety. Pulliam v Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 963, 832 N.Y.S.2d 304 (3d Dept. 2007); Sterling v 
Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1145, 833 N.Y.S.2d 684 (3d  Dept. 2007); Marziale v Alexander, 62 A.D.3d 
1227, 879 N.Y.S.2d 636 (3d Dept. 2009). The Board may conclude that the violent nature of the crime 
is an overriding consideration warranting the denial of parole release. Rodney v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 
1152, 805 N.Y.S.2d 743 (3d  Dept. 2005). The Board may emphasize the violent nature of the instant 
offense. Marnell v Dennison, 35 A.D.3d 995, 824 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den. 8 N.Y.3d 
807, 833 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2007). 
    The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole.  
See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d 
Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012).   
   The Board may take note of the inmate’s disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v 
Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). The Board may consider the inmate’s blatant disregard for the law and 
the sanctity of human life. Campbell v Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2nd Dept. 
2019). 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Anderson, Eric DIN: 92-A-7918  
Facility: Otisville CF AC No.:  08-077-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 3 of 6) 
 
   The Board may consider the probable repercussions of the criminal’s actions upon the victims’ 
families. Bottom v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789  (3d Dept. 
2006). 
   The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Espinal v. New 
York Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 04080, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4057 (3d Dept. May 23, 
2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 
50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance 
abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related 
crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 
(3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 
57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
   Insight is a  permissible factor.  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) (minimization of crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (lack of insight and failure to 
accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 
17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007) (limited insight and remorse); Matter of Almeyda v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002) (limited 
insight into why crime committed).   
 
   Community opposition was not mentioned in the decision, so the issue is moot. However, every 
appellate court in the State has upheld the use of it by the Board. Matter of Applewhite v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018). 
 
   The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
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Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 
920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
      An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
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   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
   There are no substantial evidence issues.  Matter of Tatta v. Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 
N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2006); Matter of Valderrama 
v. Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); cf. Matter of Horace v. Annucci, 
133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). 
 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079; Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 
2019). An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. 
Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York 
State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Ward v City of 
Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).  
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, 
it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 
914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
   Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. The amended regulation 
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was intended to increase transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation 
if and when the Board departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY 
Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   
 
   The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, 
do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in 
parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 
851.  
   The decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no departure to 
explain.  That is, the Board’s decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale within the 
assessment.   Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. In fact, the Board cited the COMPAS 
instrument in its denial. 
   Petitioner attempts to reduce parole release decisions to a mathematical equation and elevate 
statistics to a statutory factor that the Board must consider and address in denial decisions.  However, 
that is not the law and the cited statistics do not translate into a calculation of Petitioner’s re-offense 
risk.  Each case is unique and the Board is not bound by statistics.  Cf. Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 
41 A.D.3d 17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124-25 (1st Dept. 2007) (“each case is sui generis, and the 
Board has full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value”).   
   The regulations, by definition, don’t create a constitutional liberty interest since the 2011 enabling 
statutes don’t either. Administrative agencies are but creatures of the Legislature and are possessed 
only of those powers expressly or impliedly delegated by that body ( Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v 
New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 45 NY2d 471, 480; Matter of City of Utica v Water 
Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164, 168-169). The cornerstone of administrative law is derived from 
the principle that the Legislature may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, endow 
administrative agencies with the power to fill in the interstices in the legislative product by 
prescribing rules and regulations consistent with the enabling legislation" (Matter of Nicholas v 
Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 31, 389 N.E.2d 1086, 416 N.Y.S.2d 565 [1979]). In so doing, an agency can 
adopt regulations that go beyond the text of that legislation, provided they are not inconsistent with 
the statutory language or its underlying purposes (Goodwin v Perales, 88 N.Y.2d 383, 395, 669 
N.E.2d 234, 646 N.Y.S.2d 300 [1996]).  Under the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature 
cannot delegate its lawmaking power to an administrative agency. Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY22 24 
(1979).  
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
